

High Harmony, Low Freedom: The Measurement Paradox of Religious Moderation in Indonesia

Muhammad Nur¹

¹ Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, Indonesia

Correspondence: muha265@brin.go.id

Article Info

Article history:

Received May 20, 2026

Revised May 25, 2026

Accepted May 30, 2026

Keyword:

Freedom of religion; Indonesia;
Measurement paradox; Religious
harmony; Religious moderation.

ABSTRACT

Indonesia's religious moderation agenda has gained strong institutional support through policy documents, educational programs, and national measurement instruments. The 2025 Religious Harmony Index recorded a high score of 77.89, suggesting that interreligious coexistence remains broadly stable. At the same time, reports on freedom of religion or belief continue to record restrictions, contested houses of worship, unequal administrative treatment, and weak protection for minority communities. Drawing on qualitative documentary research and descriptive-comparative analysis of secondary data, this study examines the gap between harmony-based measurement and rights-based evidence. The findings argue that high harmony and low freedom can coexist because they are produced through different evidentiary logics. Harmony indicators mainly capture perception, social acceptance, and cooperation, while rights-based reports record access, obstruction, actors, affected communities, and institutional responses. The measurement paradox appears when harmony is treated as a proxy for religious freedom. A more credible evaluation of religious moderation requires a paired reading of social coexistence and rights enforcement, especially where minority rights become locally contested and administratively difficult to protect.



© 2026 The Authors. Published by Punggawa Legacy Center. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>)

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's recent confidence in religious moderation rests on a measurement story that deserves closer scrutiny. The Ministry of Religious Affairs reported that the 2025 Religious Harmony Index reached 77.89, its highest score since the survey began in 2015. Such a figure supports a persuasive official narrative that interreligious life remains broadly stable and that moderation has become an effective language for governing pluralism. Yet the same period is marked by civil society records on freedom of religion or belief that continue to document disrupted worship, contested houses of worship, local resistance toward minority communities, and inconsistent state protection (Qoumas et al., 2024). The contrast should not be reduced to a familiar disagreement between government optimism and activist criticism, because the deeper issue concerns what different instruments are able to know about religious life.

Harmony and freedom are different objects of measurement, although public policy debates often treat them as if they describe the same social condition. A harmony index usually captures perception, coexistence, willingness to cooperate, and the general tone of relations among religious groups. Freedom of religion or belief reports follow a different evidentiary path. They track incidents, affected communities, responsible actors, administrative barriers, and legal pressures that shape whether a group can worship, teach, gather, or maintain its religious identity without coercion (Petri, 2025). A large part of the population may experience interreligious life as peaceful while a small congregation spends years negotiating worship permits with local officials, neighbourhood committees, and groups that contest its presence. Both descriptions may be accurate, but they do not answer the same question.

Religious moderation becomes more difficult to assess once it moves from ethical vocabulary into state governance. In Indonesia, moderation now appears in ministerial programs, educational materials, bureaucratic training, public communication, and strategic roadmaps. Such institutional

expansion gives the policy an administrative shape. Moderation can be promoted, audited, scored, and reported. Measurement then influences what counts as success and which problems receive institutional attention (Singgih, 2023). A harmony-based indicator can help the state read broad patterns of tolerance and social cooperation, yet problems faced by vulnerable groups are rarely visible as a national attitude. They appear more quietly, through delayed permits, negotiated worship, selective policing, and local decisions that avoid conflict by limiting minority claims.

The existing scholarship on Indonesian religious moderation has developed several important lines of inquiry. Studies of Islamic education, interfaith dialogue, counter-radicalism, civic pluralism, and state-religion relations have clarified why moderation became attractive as a public language after periods of religious polarization and security anxiety (Nasir & Rijal, 2021). More critical works have also questioned the political uses of moderation when the term is tied to majoritarian expectations, bureaucratic conformity, or suspicion toward religious expressions seen as too conservative or too liberal (Cholil, 2023). A less settled debate concerns measurement itself. The unresolved question is whether instruments designed to read harmony can also evaluate freedom, especially where the relevant harm is not open violence but conditional access to rights.

The phrase “low freedom” in this argument does not claim that Indonesia lacks religious liberty in every respect. The term refers to persistent restrictions, unequal access, and conditional protection that remain visible in freedom-based reports despite high harmony scores. A house of worship dispute offers a concrete way to see the gap. A minority congregation may comply with formal requirements yet still face pressure from residents, hesitation from local authorities, and a slow administrative process that turns a constitutional right into a negotiated privilege (Arifin et al., 2021). From a harmony perspective, the absence of open confrontation may suggest that social order has been maintained. From a freedom perspective, the same calm may reveal how rights are narrowed before conflict becomes public.

The Indonesian case also raises a broader question for the governance of religion beyond Indonesia. Indicators that measure coexistence are politically useful because they translate a complex religious landscape into manageable evidence. They allow governments to claim progress, compare regions, and design programs. Their usefulness becomes fragile when harmony is treated as a proxy for religious freedom (Modood & Sealy, 2025). Coexistence measures the quality of relations among groups, while freedom tests the enforceability of rights when those rights become unpopular. A policy may succeed in reducing visible friction and still leave minority communities dependent on local approval. That distinction is the point at which religious moderation becomes a measurement problem rather than a simple policy achievement.

The argument developed here offers a measurement critique of religious moderation. Religious moderation is not rejected as a policy agenda, since social trust, anti-violence, and interreligious cooperation remain necessary in a plural society. The concern lies in the evaluative weight given to harmony when freedom is harder to see, harder to quantify, and politically less convenient to protect. A credible assessment of moderation should place harmony indicators beside rights-based evidence on worship access, non-discrimination, administrative equality, and institutional response to coercion (Zaluchu et al., 2025). Such an approach would make success harder to claim, but in a way that strengthens the democratic meaning of moderation. The most difficult test of religious moderation begins where an unpopular community asks the state to protect rights that local consensus would rather postpone.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses qualitative documentary research supported by descriptive-comparative analysis of secondary data. The design was chosen because the central concern is not to measure public attitudes toward religious tolerance through a new survey, but to examine how religious moderation is assessed through existing instruments and reports. The analysis works with documents that already organize religious life into measurable categories, policy claims, and records of restriction. Such a design is suitable for tracing the gap between harmony-based measurement and freedom-based evidence, particularly where both kinds of data speak about the same national setting but rely on different assumptions about what counts as religious moderation (Petri & Bainbridge, 2026).

The data corpus consists of official policy documents, national measurement reports, independent reports on freedom of religion or belief, and selected international datasets on government restrictions

and social hostilities involving religion. Official materials include publications issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, especially documents related to the Religious Harmony Index and the national agenda for strengthening religious moderation. Independent reports are used to capture incidents and patterns that may not appear in perception-based indicators, including restrictions on worship, contested religious facilities, discriminatory treatment, and weak protection for minority communities. International reports are treated as supplementary sources rather than external standards that automatically override domestic data. Their function is to widen the comparison between harmony indicators and rights-based indicators.

The analytical process followed four connected steps. The first step mapped how harmony is defined and measured in official instruments, with attention to the categories of tolerance, equality, cooperation, and social coexistence. The second step examined how freedom of religion or belief is recorded in independent and international reports, especially through incidents, affected communities, responsible actors, and institutional responses. The third step compared the two evidentiary logics by asking which dimensions of religious life become visible in each source and which dimensions remain less visible. The final step interpreted the policy implications of this gap for the measurement of religious moderation, especially where social calm coexists with conditional access to rights.

The unit of analysis is the measurement framework through which religious moderation is assessed, reported, and translated into policy success. Individual attitudes, specific religious communities, and local conflicts are not treated as independent field sites. They are examined only when they clarify how different documents construct evidence about harmony and freedom. This distinction is important because the study does not claim to provide a full empirical map of religious tolerance in Indonesia. The purpose is more limited and more specific. The article evaluates the adequacy of existing measurement practices when religious moderation is expected to account for both peaceful coexistence and equal religious freedom.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Measuring Harmony The State's Architecture of Religious Moderation

Indonesia's official measurement of religious harmony has become a central route through which religious moderation is assessed as a public achievement. The 2025 Religious Harmony Index reached 77.89 and was presented by the Ministry of Religious Affairs as the highest score since the survey began in 2015. That number does more than report a social condition. It gives the moderation agenda a statistical form, allowing interreligious life to be narrated as improving, stable, and administratively manageable (Itmam & Aouich, 2024). Harmony is no longer treated only as a public aspiration or a moral expectation among religious communities. Through the index, it becomes a policy object that can be scored, compared across time, linked to regional governance, and placed within the state's account of successful pluralism. The first analytical issue, then, is not whether the score is accurate in a narrow technical sense, but what kind of religious reality the score is designed to make visible.

The index relies on three main dimensions that fit the state's harmony-oriented agenda: tolerance, equality, and togetherness or cooperation. These dimensions are plausible for measuring coexistence because they capture how citizens perceive relations across religious boundaries, whether they accept difference in everyday social life, and how far interreligious interaction can be sustained without open hostility. The 2025 data are especially revealing because tolerance recorded the highest dimension score, while togetherness was reported as the weakest among the three (Daheri et al., 2023). That internal difference matters. It suggests that acceptance of religious difference may be easier to register than deeper forms of cross-community participation. A person may approve of neighbours from another faith and still have limited involvement in shared civic or religiously mixed activities. Harmony, in this sense, appears strongest at the level of attitude and more fragile when it requires sustained social engagement.

The category of equality deserves closer attention because the same word can carry different meanings in different measurement traditions. Within a harmony index, equality is largely read through perception and social acceptance. Respondents may express support for equal treatment among religious groups, and such responses matter for assessing the climate of coexistence. In a rights-based inquiry, however, equality is tested through access, enforcement, and remedy. A community that is formally recognized but unable to secure local approval for worship does not face inequality merely as a problem of attitude. The problem moves through administrative files, neighbourhood objections,

delayed decisions, and official reluctance to defend a right before it becomes politically costly. The index can register a favourable equality perception, while the institutional route through which equality becomes practical remains outside its strongest field of vision.

The 2025–2029 roadmap for strengthening religious moderation gives this measurement architecture a broader policy setting. The roadmap places moderation within education, social ecosystems, and national character formation, which means the agenda is meant to shape institutions rather than remain a temporary campaign. Such planning may give moderation greater continuity and prevent the term from being reduced to ceremonial interfaith language. At the same time, a more mature policy architecture makes measurement more consequential (Saebani & Rahman, 2025). Once moderation is connected to programs, training, institutional targets, and public reports, the indicators used to evaluate it begin to influence how success is recognized. A rise in harmony scores can support the claim that moderation is working, even though the score mainly speaks about coexistence and perception. The more the state relies on measurable harmony, the more important it becomes to ask whether freedom-related harms are entering the same evaluative field (Donger & Katsouraki, 2022).

This issue becomes clearer through the politics of aggregation. National scores are attractive because they compress dispersed realities into a figure that policymakers and the public can understand. Aggregation helps compare regions, track trends, and identify broad patterns. Yet the same process can weaken the visibility of groups whose problems are localized, numerically small, or socially inconvenient. A minority congregation facing repeated resistance over worship space may barely affect the national picture, particularly if the surrounding majority continues to describe interreligious relations as peaceful. The score may remain high because most people do not experience the restriction as their own problem. This is not a simple flaw in survey design. The deeper concern lies in the mismatch between a tool that captures general perception and a rights problem that is often experienced by a specific group at a specific administrative point.

Harmony measurement also tends to privilege the absence of visible friction. This tendency is understandable because open conflict has real social costs, and Indonesia's history gives policymakers good reason to value stability. Still, moderation becomes thin when stability is treated as evidence that rights are secure. Local peace can be preserved because officials solve a dispute by facilitating equal protection. Local peace can also be preserved because a vulnerable community is encouraged to wait, relocate, reduce the visibility of worship, or accept an informal compromise that never appears in national statistics. From a harmony perspective, conflict has been avoided. From a freedom perspective, the route to exercising a right has become conditional. The difference between those two readings is precisely where the measurement problem begins to take institutional form.

The state's architecture of religious moderation therefore provides an important but incomplete starting point. Official indicators capture a real layer of Indonesia's religious landscape: citizens' willingness to coexist, their perception of equal social relations, and the degree to which interreligious cooperation remains possible. These are not minor matters. A country with weak social trust would struggle to sustain freedom in practice, since legal enforcement often depends on local conditions that make protection politically bearable (Zubaidah et al., 2023). The limitation appears when harmony is asked to serve as a shorthand for moderation as a whole. Religious moderation is tested most sharply where peaceful coexistence meets unequal power, especially where a small community needs the state to defend its rights against local resistance. That kind of test cannot be fully answered by a national harmony score, which leads the analysis toward freedom-based evidence and the types of restriction that remain visible when harmony appears statistically strong.

2. Reading Freedom Restrictions Minority Vulnerability and Conditional Rights

Rights-based reports enter the analysis at the point where harmony measurement becomes least able to speak. They do not begin from the general mood of coexistence, but from situations in which a person or community tries to exercise a right and faces obstruction, pressure, or uneven protection. SETARA Institute's 2024 report recorded 260 events and 402 actions related to violations of freedom of religion or belief. The distinction between events and actions is methodologically important. An event refers to a concrete occurrence, while actions capture the number of restrictive or discriminatory acts that may arise within or around that occurrence. A single dispute over worship can involve social pressure, administrative hesitation, and security inaction, so the report's categories already treat religious freedom as a chain of institutional and social responses rather than a single incident.

This structure of reporting gives rights-based documents a different evidentiary logic from the Religious Harmony Index. Harmony measurement asks how citizens perceive relations among religious groups. Incident-based records ask what happens when rights move from general recognition into practice. The difference becomes visible in the way these reports identify affected communities, distinguish state and non-state actors, and examine the response of officials when pressure appears around a contested religious activity. Numbers matter, but their value lies in the categories behind them. A violation is not recorded simply because disagreement exists. It becomes analytically relevant because disagreement is followed by obstruction, discriminatory treatment, or an institutional response that fails to secure equal access to religious life (Ayub et al., 2023).

The main pattern emerging from these reports is the conditional character of rights. Constitutional language may recognize religious liberty, and national policy may speak in favour of moderation, yet the practical route to exercising a religious right often passes through local negotiation. A congregation that seeks to worship in a permanent building may satisfy formal requirements but still wait on neighbourhood approval, administrative discretion, and police willingness to prevent intimidation before the right becomes usable. Democratic societies can contain disagreement over public space. The deeper problem begins when disagreement becomes a reason for officials to delay protection or treat a right as something that must wait until social resistance becomes manageable.

Houses of worship provide the clearest window into this problem because they connect belief, community life, urban presence, and administrative authority in one site. Disputes over houses of worship reveal how religious freedom is filtered through local power. A minority congregation may hold the documents it considers sufficient, yet the process can remain exposed to residents' objections and official caution. Harmony may be preserved because the dispute is contained, postponed, or shifted into informal negotiation (Kadir, 2025a). Freedom becomes thinner when the ability to worship depends less on legal entitlement than on the endurance of a community that has already tried to comply (Ayub et al., 2023).

Such cases clarify why rights-based reports should not be read as a simple rebuttal of harmony data. A city, province, or country can maintain broadly peaceful interreligious relations while still failing specific groups at decisive moments. For the affected community, the same event can structure years of uncertainty. The majority's perception of calm is not false, but incomplete. Reports that track restrictions provide another angle by asking what happens to groups whose claims lack local support or whose presence unsettles an established religious landscape. The role of the state is difficult to classify in these situations because restrictions are often co-produced. Some pressure comes from residents or organized local groups, while state institutions determine whether that pressure becomes legally decisive. Officials may describe delay as a pragmatic effort to maintain order. Such responses can appear sensible in the short term. They become problematic when order is achieved by shifting the burden of adjustment onto the vulnerable group. Religious moderation then faces a test that harmony measurement cannot settle. A moderate public order cannot depend on the least powerful party absorbing the cost of peace.

International datasets reinforce this concern by asking questions that domestic harmony scores do not normally ask. Pew Research Center's 2026 report placed Indonesia among countries with very high government restrictions on religion in the 2023 data. Global datasets simplify domestic complexities, but their categories are useful for comparison. Government restriction measures examine how laws, policies, and official actions limit religious belief and practice, while social hostility measures examine pressure outside the state. Placed beside a high harmony score, the Pew classification does not automatically invalidate domestic data. It shows that stable interreligious perception can coexist with rights-related restrictions at the level of law, policy, or official practice (Mahmudah et al., 2025).

Minority vulnerability is central to this second layer of evidence. Communities most exposed to restriction are not always those involved in open conflict. Some live with quieter insecurity, where worship schedules, institutional visibility, public teaching, and community gatherings are adjusted to avoid resistance (Kadir, 2025b). A group may remain formally recognized as part of the citizenry while its ordinary religious life depends on informal accommodation with local actors (Evolvi, 2022). Such adjustments rarely enter national debate unless they escalate into visible controversy. The absence of escalation can then be misread as proof that moderation is functioning smoothly. Incident-based records

unsettle this reading because they treat constrained practice as analytically relevant even when conflict remains controlled.

Religious moderation therefore needs a rights-based test. Moderation can encourage civility, reduce hostility, and sustain intergroup cooperation, but those achievements do not answer whether unpopular communities are protected when their claims become inconvenient. The revealing moment is not the public ceremony where religious leaders affirm tolerance, but the administrative meeting where an official decides whether a small congregation may worship without further delay (Putri, 2025). At that point, moderation either carries the weight of equal citizenship or retreats into conflict avoidance. Rights-based reports record these moments with greater sensitivity because they follow obstruction, victimization, and institutional response rather than the general atmosphere of social coexistence.

The evidence considered here does not simply contradict the official story of harmony. It exposes the underside of a policy success measured mainly through coexistence. A high harmony score may be accurate as a description of broad public attitudes, yet incident-based records show that rights may remain contingent in local settings where minority claims disturb the comfort of social order. The analytical implication leads directly to the measurement paradox. High harmony and low freedom can appear together because both claims are produced by valid but different evidentiary logics, and religious moderation becomes fragile when one is allowed to stand in for the other.

3. The Measurement Paradox Why Harmony Does Not Necessarily Mean Freedom

The paradox becomes visible once the 2025 Religious Harmony Index score of 77.89 is read beside incident-based records such as SETARA's 260 events and 402 actions on freedom of religion or belief in 2024. These figures should not be treated as a contest between official optimism and civil society criticism. They are produced through different evidentiary designs. The index converts perceptions of tolerance, equality, and togetherness into a national picture of coexistence, while rights-based reports organize evidence through events, actions, actors, affected communities, and institutional responses. The gap between the two does not arise simply because one source is more critical than the other. It arises because each source asks a different question about religious life and then makes a different part of that life visible.

Aggregation gives the first explanation for this paradox. Harmony scores are built to capture broad perception, and that design is useful for reading the general atmosphere of interreligious relations across a large and diverse country. Yet a tool that works well at the level of national mood is less sensitive to specific forms of minoritarian harm. A small congregation facing resistance over worship space may have little effect on a national score, especially when most citizens still report peaceful relations with religious others. The harm is real, but its scale is local and its burden is carried by a group with limited demographic weight. The more specific the harm, the more likely it becomes absorbed into a favourable national picture.

Social calm deepens the problem. Harmony indicators understandably value the absence of open conflict, since visible religious confrontation carries serious social and political costs. Still, calm can be produced through different routes. Communities may avoid conflict because interreligious trust has grown and officials protect rights consistently. A quieter outcome can also emerge because a vulnerable group delays its worship activities, accepts informal compromise, or reduces public visibility after learning that formal insistence may trigger stronger rejection. From a distance, both situations may look stable. For a rights-based reading, only the first reflects equal freedom, while the second reveals an order maintained by the self-restraint of those who already occupy a weaker position (Chotimah et al., 2025).

Majoritarian comfort is used here as an interpretive category, not as a moral accusation against a religious majority. The phrase refers to the way local approval can enter administrative judgment when officials manage religious claims through public order reasoning. A community may be tolerated as long as its presence remains socially unobtrusive. Once a worship facility, teaching activity, or public gathering is framed as disturbing local expectations, the limits of acceptance become practical rather than rhetorical. Moderation then risks being assessed through manageable difference, where protection is offered most smoothly to claims that do not unsettle local consensus. The institutional problem lies in the moment when state actors treat social resistance as a reason to slow down rights rather than as a reason to enforce them more carefully.

The comparison also reveals a gap between perception and enforceability. A respondent may express support for tolerance while remaining unaffected by the administrative difficulty faced by another community. Equality may appear strong in survey perception, yet become weaker when a contested group must wait for local signatures, police assurance, or a district official willing to absorb political pressure. Cooperation among recognized religious leaders may continue in public forums, while communities outside dominant interfaith networks experience the state through permits, surveillance, and negotiation. Religious freedom becomes visible at the point where general goodwill is no longer enough. A measurement framework that privileges perception may miss the administrative threshold where moderation must become a decision about equal protection.

A stronger evaluation of religious moderation should not replace one evidentiary logic with another. Harmony data should remain part of the assessment because broad coexistence is a real public good, especially in a country where religious identity is embedded in neighbourhood life, schooling, electoral politics, and local authority. Rights-based reports also have limits because they are designed to record restrictions, not the ordinary routines of peaceful interreligious life (Kadir, 2026). The analytical problem appears when harmony carries the full burden of evaluating moderation. Coexistence tells policymakers whether religious relations remain workable at a broad social level. Freedom asks whether rights remain enforceable when a community lacks local power, social familiarity, or administrative sympathy.

The policy implication is more demanding than a call for adding another indicator to an existing index. Religious moderation needs to be evaluated through a paired reading of social coexistence and rights enforcement (Tinambunan et al., 2025). Harmony indicators can still measure trust, acceptance, and cooperation, but they need to be read beside evidence on access to worship, administrative equality, official response to intimidation, and the treatment of communities whose claims are unpopular in a local setting. This paired reading would make success harder to claim, although that difficulty is analytically useful. A moderation policy that passes through rights-sensitive measurement would be less satisfied with the preservation of order and more attentive to how order is produced.

The paradox of high harmony and low freedom should therefore be read as a warning about measurement rather than as a final verdict on Indonesia's religious life (Mihai, 2023). Harmony measurement captures an important layer of plural coexistence, but it cannot answer every question raised by freedom of religion or belief. Incident-based and restriction-oriented evidence records the moments where coexistence is strained by unequal power, local objection, and administrative caution. Religious moderation becomes more credible when these layers are read together. A high harmony score should open further inquiry into who experiences harmony, under what institutional conditions, and at what cost to communities whose rights still depend on negotiation.

CONCLUSION

The paradox between high harmony and low freedom does not arise from a simple contradiction between state data and civil society reports. The more important issue lies in the different evidentiary designs through which religious life is assessed. Indonesia's Religious Harmony Index captures a real layer of interreligious coexistence, especially public perceptions of tolerance, equality, and cooperation. Rights-based reports record another layer, where religious freedom is tested through access to worship, administrative treatment, local pressure, and institutional response. A high harmony score can therefore coexist with restrictions that remain concentrated in specific communities, specific localities, and specific administrative moments. The problem is not that harmony measurement has no value, but that harmony becomes analytically insufficient when it is treated as evidence that religious freedom is already secure.

A more credible evaluation of religious moderation requires a paired reading of coexistence and rights enforcement. Religious moderation should continue to value trust, civility, and cooperation among religious communities, but its democratic weight depends on whether unpopular groups can exercise their rights without waiting for majority approval or prolonged administrative negotiation. This argument does not reject moderation as a public policy agenda. Rather, it suggests that moderation becomes stronger when its measurement is made more difficult, because difficult measurement forces the state to look beyond calm surfaces and ask how social order is produced. Indonesia's experience offers a broader lesson for the governance of religion. A society may appear harmonious while some communities still carry the cost of peace through silence, delay, and compromise. Religious moderation

becomes more defensible when harmony is read together with freedom, and when policy success is tested at the point where equal citizenship is least comfortable to protect.

REFERENCES

- Arifin, R., Helmi, H., Nte, N. D., Waspihah, W., & Latifiani, D. (2021). The adversity on establishing places of worship: has religious freedom failed in Indonesia? *Legality : Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum*, 29(1), 93–113. <https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v29i1.15317>
- Ayub, Z. A., Dinata, A. W., Ambarini, N. S. B., Susanti, P., & Elcaputera, A. (2023). Freedom Of Religion And Belief Under Supreme Court Verdict Study Case On Supreme Court Decision Number 17/P/HUM/2021. *Jurnal Hukum Dan Peradilan*, 12(1), 1. <https://doi.org/10.25216/jhp.12.1.2023.1-28>
- Cholil, S. (2023). Freedom of Religion amid Polarization and Religious Moderation Policy. *Interreligious Studies and Intercultural Theology*, 6(2), 196–204. <https://doi.org/10.1558/isit.24603>
- Chotimah, C., Qudsy, S. Z., & Yusuf, M. (2025). Superficial implementation of religious moderation in Islamic educational management. *Cogent Education*, 12(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/2331186X.2024.2442235>
- Daheri, M., Warsah, I., Morganna, R., Putri, O. A., & Adelia, P. (2023). Strengthening Religious Moderation: Learning from the Harmony of Multireligious People in Indonesia. *Journal of Population and Social Studies*, 31, 571–586. <https://doi.org/10.25133/JPSSv312023.032>
- Donger, S., & Katsouraki, E. (2022). Vulnerable Paths to Freedom. *A Journal of the Performing Arts*, 27(1), 1–6.
- Evolvi, G. (2022). Religion and the internet: digital religion, (hyper)mediated spaces, and materiality. *Zeitschrift Für Religion, Gesellschaft Und Politik*, 6(1), 9–25. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41682-021-00087-9>
- Itmam, M. S., & Aouich, A. (2024). Legal Politics of Religious Moderation and State Defense Policy at Public Universities. *Justicia Islamica*, 21(1), 87–110. <https://doi.org/10.21154/justicia.v21i1.9242>
- Kadir, Z. K. (2025a). Kriminalisasi Nilai Moral: Konstruksi Kebijakan Kriminal di Arab Saudi dan Turki. *Jurnal El-Thawalib*, 6(1), 71–84.
- Kadir, Z. K. (2025b). Kriminologi Reaksioner: Sayap Kanan, Moralitas, dan Kriminalisasi Budaya Pop dalam Era Post-Truth. *Jurnal Intelek Insan Cendikia*, 2(5), 10108–10121.
- Kadir, Z. K. (2026). Neurocriminology and the Next Generation of Criminological Theory: Integration, Limits, and Ethical Risks. *Punggawa Global Research: Jurnal Multidisiplin*, 1(1), 1–8.
- Mahmudah, S., Alamsyah, A., Firdawaty, L., Yuliatin, Y., Yanti, I., & Asnawi, H. S. (2025). Resistance to Religious Moderation in Indonesian's Lower to Middle-Class Communities. *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun*, 13(2), 931–958. <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v13i2.2011>
- Mihai, C. (2023). Media, Religion, and the Public Sphere. *Religions*, 14(1253), 1–14.
- Modood, T., & Sealy, T. (2025). The governance of religious diversity: A comparative-normative exercise. *Ethnicities*, 25(5), 762–769. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968251353686>
- Nasir, M., & Rijal, M. K. (2021). Keeping the middle path: mainstreaming religious moderation through Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia. *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, 11(2), 213–241. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v11i2.213-241>
- Petri, D. P. (2025). Measuring what matters: Evolving Metrics of Religious Freedom. *The Review*.
- Petri, D. P., & Bainbridge, J. T. (2026). Subnational Divergence in Religious Freedom: A Variance-Based Approach to Democratisation in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X261446653>
- Putri, N. S. (2025). Moral Offenses Under Indonesian Criminal Code 2023 in Perspective of Religious Minority. *Jurnal HAM*, 16(1), 61. <https://doi.org/10.30641/ham.2025.16.61-76>
- Qoumas, Y. C., Binti Mohd. Hussain, R. B., & Bin Abdul Rahim, R. A. (2024). The Dissemination of Religious Moderation Through the Policy of the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs. *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)*, 12(1), 147. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v12i1.27552>

- Saebani, B. A., & Rahman, M. T. (2025). From Outsider to Engagement: The Transformation of a Puritanical Islamic Organization through Government-Led Religious Moderation Initiatives. *Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization*, 15(1), 277–295. <https://doi.org/10.32350/jitc.151.16>
- Singgih, E. G. (2023). Religious Moderation as Good Life: Two Responses to the Ministry of Religious Affairs' Directive on Religious Moderation in Indonesia. *Exchange*, 52(3), 220–240. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1572543x-bja10038>
- Tinambunan, E. R. L., Gegel, I. K., Sarbini, P. B., & Baik, G. Z. (2025). Implication Abu Dhabi Document: to build religious moderation with brotherhood-sisterhood and friendship in Indonesia. *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 12(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2025.2451514>
- Zaluchu, S. E., Widodo, P., & Kriswanto, A. (2025). Conceptual reconstruction of religious moderation in the Indonesian context based on previous research: Bibliometric analysis. *Social Sciences & Humanities Open*, 11, 101552. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2025.101552>
- Zubaidah, S., Kamsilaniah, K., Shadiq, M. A., Hamid, Abd. H., & Fitriani, F. (2023). Anarchist Demonstration During the Exercise of the Right to Freedom of Opinion. *SIGn Jurnal Hukum*, 4(2), 351–363. <https://doi.org/10.37276/sjh.v4i2.222>