Pergantian Kabinet di Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat: Analisis Komparatif melalui Pendekatan Tradisional, Rasional, dan Struktural
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Abstract
Sistem presidensial di Indonesia dan Amerika Serikat sama-sama memberi presiden kewenangan atas kabinet, tetapi praktik pergantian kabinetnya berbeda. Penelitian ini bertujuan membandingkan pergantian kabinet kedua negara melalui pendekatan tradisional, rasional, dan struktural. Penelitian menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan desain deskriptif-komparatif melalui studi pustaka terhadap artikel jurnal, buku, dan dokumen hukum, yang dianalisis melalui reduksi data, penyajian data, dan penarikan kesimpulan. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa secara tradisional, presiden Indonesia mengangkat dan memberhentikan menteri tanpa persetujuan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, sedangkan presiden Amerika Serikat memerlukan persetujuan Senat untuk mengangkat pejabat tinggi tertentu. Secara rasional, reshuffle di Indonesia berkaitan dengan pengelolaan koalisi dan kinerja menteri, sedangkan di Amerika Serikat presiden mempertimbangkan loyalitas, kompetensi, dan peluang konfirmasi Senat. Secara struktural, sistem multipartai di Indonesia mendorong kabinet koalisi, sedangkan sistem dua partai dan pemisahan kekuasaan di Amerika Serikat menempatkan Senat sebagai pembatas. Ketiga pendekatan tersebut saling melengkapi dalam menjelaskan perbedaan pergantian kabinet.
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