From Propaganda to Synthetic Operations: Generative AI and the Transformation of Cyberterrorism

Abstract

Existing studies largely treated generative AI in cyberterrorism as a tool for synthetic propaganda, leaving unclear when its outputs began to support operational preparation and how existing law could respond. This study examined the movement from AI-assisted propaganda toward synthetic operations and assessed its legal implications. It used normative legal research with conceptual and statutory approaches, supported by scholarly literature, open-source documents, and European Union law. The findings indicated that documented terrorist use remained concentrated in content production, translation, adaptation, and reuse. Generative AI nevertheless acquired operational relevance when outputs could be applied with limited correction and connected to later tasks in preparing or carrying out terrorist activity. Open evidence did not establish autonomous or systematic AI-driven terrorist workflows; synthetic operations therefore remained an analytical threshold rather than a settled practice. The synthetic origin of content also did not determine legal responsibility. Criminal attribution continued to depend on human intent, use, and connection to prohibited conduct, while regulatory duties varied according to the role and capacity of model providers, applications, hosting services, and online platforms. Technology-neutral rules remained relevant, although proof, attribution, and content-focused regulation became more difficult when assistance was distributed across services and occurred before public dissemination.